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Abstract
Modern cryptography can achieve levels of security and authen-
tication that non-specialists nd literally incredible. Techniques in-
clude information-hiding protocols, zero-knowledge proofs and public
key cryptosystems; they can be used to support applications like dig-
ital signatures, digital cash, on-line poker and secure voting in ways
that are provably secure|far more secure than the traditional systems
they replace. This paper describes simple versions of such applications
that have been used to give school-children and the general public a
broad understanding of what can be achieved, and how.
1 Introduction
Security and privacy are pressing social issues in an era when much
commerce is conducted electronically, and personal information is stored
on computers and transmitted over computer networks. Modern cryp-
tographic systems can implement extremely high levels of security, but
their capabilities are not widely appreciated by the general public. For
example, many people use debit cards to pay for goods, where money
is transferred directly from their bank account to the store's. In the
process the bank nds out where the purchase is being made, and could
build up a prole of the person's shopping habits. Despite this loss of
privacy, debit cards are widely accepted. Most people are quite un-
aware that cryptographic protocols exist which enable the transaction
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1to be carried out reliably without the bank being able to identify who
the money is going to! This seems incredible|literally unbelievable|
to people who have never encountered public key cryptosystems and
information hiding protocols.
If more people knew about such things, they would lobby for their
adoption to better protect privacy in everyday transactions. Moreover,
it would cultivate a higher level of trust for systems that use sophis-
ticated protocols to protect information. Understanding the technical
issues involved goes a long way towards enabling informed decisions
on privacy issues, just as an understanding of biology goes a long way
towards making informed decisions on environmental issues. The ac-
tivities described in this paper are intended to take some of the science
ction out of people's understanding of computer security. The upcom-
ing generation of computer users deserves a clear view of the technical
issues that underpin the myriad of computerized systems that perme-
ate our lives.
Most people's knowledge of information security dates from their
school days, when they may have been introduced to a Caesar cipher,
with variations that involve mappings to special symbols, and perhaps
other private key systems such as the one-time pad. But most people
have no idea about the advanced cryptographic techniques that are
available to solve problems such as key distribution and authentication.
Cryptographic experts often regard the techniques as too abstruse for
school-children to understand. We disagree. The goal of our work is
to make advanced ideas understandable to people who are not in a
position to invest heavily in preparatory study.
This paper describes several simple activities, designed for active
participation by children or lay-people, which inculcate an understand-
ing of seemingly impossible cryptographic techniques. The activities
use only basic arithmetic and elementary puzzle-solving ability. More-
over, they are \unplugged" in that they do not require the use of a
computer. This makes them widely accessible, regardless of hardware
or software availability.
We begin by describing simple activities that expose some of the
issues involved, namely key distribution and information hiding. We
demonstrate a protocol for coin-tossing over a telephone, and present
two public-key cryptosystems that are based on puzzles that are sim-
ple to understand but hard to solve|in computer science parlance,
intractable.
We have found the best approach for all of these activities is to
have students work through them using concrete examples, explaining
each step as they proceed. We prefer to allow them to discover for
themselves how the methods work, where possible guring out the
completion of the task by themselves. They can then contemplate
ways to attack the protocols, and ways to deter attacks.
2More details of our computer-free approach to presenting com-
puter science is available from the \Unplugged" web site at http:/
/unplugged.canterbury.ac.nz/
2 The key distribution problem
We start by using an overhead foil to show a facsimile Elizabethan ci-
pher. This is of some historical interest, and illustrates many elemen-
tary issues. A squiggle occurs frequently, and looks from the context
to be the letter e, but closer inspection shows that t is more frequent.
This discussion leads into standard techniques for coding.
To decode this sort of message requires the recipient to have a key.
How is the key distributed? What happens if an eavesdropper acquires
the key|for, by assumption, there are eavesdroppers, otherwise codes
would not be needed in the rst place!
To help explain the issues, we use a chain and several padlocks.
The loose chain is explained to be equivalent to a plain-text message.
It is about a metre long, and its ends are painted a distinctive colour
(this helps greatly when the chain is given to the audience, who tend
to fumble if they can't nd the ends quickly). When the ends of the
chain are padlocked together, this is explained as representing a coded
message. Clearly, to unlock the ends of the chain, a key is required.
We now divide the group into three (each group running front to
back), and give the chain, padlock, and key to someone on, say, the
right-hand side. The challenge is to pass the locked chain across the
room to the left side, via the mischievous middle section. To avoid the
chain being thrown across thoughtlessly (or even the key being lost),
the audience is instructed that before anything happens, the people on
the right-hand side must explain what is to happen so that everyone
can follow it.
This illustrates the key distribution problem. With padlocks, there
are several solutions. For instance, the chain could be sent across
locked, locked with a second padlock on the other side, then returned.
Back on the rst side, the rst padlock is removed (the key never
having left that side), and the chain sent back, still padlocked by the
left side's padlock. When the locked chain gets back, that side can
remove the padlock easily with their key (which never left that side).
This technique relies on commutative coding. This is easily illus-
trated with a Caesar cipher, although the weakness of this particular
cipher has already been pointed out.
The technique also shows that the people in the middle saw three
messages cross over. The audience may be able to deduce something
from this activity|the existence of a message may constitute useful
information in itself, and heightened activity may draw attention to
3itself. To avoid this, dummy messages could be sent to keep the level
of activity consistent.
There is a problem with the two-padlock scheme, which we illus-
trate as follows. The middle group is given a third padlock. The left
team now send their locked chain across. The middle group simu-
lates the intended recipients|so far as the senders are concerned, the
protocol has been followed exactly. Since they dare not enter into a
plain-text discussion, they have no way of knowing that the intended
recipient failed to get the message. Meanwhile, the middle group are
celebrating having an unlocked chain. Even worse, the middle group
can simulate the sender, and pass a locked message on to the intended
recipient (possibly tampered with), and the victim again has no way
of knowing that the code has been intercepted.
So not only do we have a key distribution problem (partly solved)
but we have an authentication problem (not solved). We note that
secrecy and identity are opposite poles. If you are very secret, how can
anyone be sure who you are? These problems provide motivation for
the public key systems described below.
How does the audience relate the chains to the digital world? Hav-
ing prepared a sawn-up padlock, it is easy to show that a persistent
code-breaker could always dismantle a padlock, or X-ray it, and hence
crack the code. We show that knowing the inside of the padlock enables
a key to be constructed (they are isomorphic). In the digital world we
have to assume that it is easy for a code-breaker to see our message,
and so techniques other than secrecy of the encryption method have
to be employed.
This leads into the abstract idea of one-way trapdoor functions,
which are introduced as mathematical objects that behave like pad-
locks: they are easy to lock, but hard to unlock unless you know
the secret. In the later sections we introduce three one-way functions
(boolean circuits, perfect codes, and directed cycle partitions) that can
be related back to the padlock demonstration.
3 Information hiding
The next activity illustrates the role of random numbers in keeping
information private. The challenge to the group is to work out the
average age (or salary, or some other sensitive value) of the group,
without anyone revealing their age to anyone else. If there are adults
in the group then their reaction to the challenge often conrms that
the information is indeed sensitive!
We nd it helpful to begin by asking the group to suggest how
this could be done. Usually the methods suggested will involve leaking
some information.
4The method that we use involves passing around a pad of paper,
with one sheet for each person. The rst person writes down a four-
digit random number (which they retain), adds their age to it, and
passes the pad with the sum written on the top page to the next
person. (At this time you can point out that the only information
available is that the person's age is less than some four digit number.)
That person adds their age to the number, tears o the top page, and
passes their sum on to the third person. This continues around the
group. At the end the rst person is given the pad; they subtract their
original random number, and divide by the number of people in the
group to obtain the average age. Rather than explaining the whole
procedure beforehand, we recommend getting the group started and
allowing them to work out for themselves how to complete the task.
This can be followed by discussion about how people might attempt
to cheat, and why it may or may not work. A primitive voting scheme
could be proposed, where each person adds one or zero to the total
depending on whether they are for or against an issue. Problems such
as people adding more than one, or less than zero, can be discussed.
4 Coin tossing by telephone
This activity involves using a one-way function to perform a coin-toss
over a telephone. One of the better known cryptographic techniques
relating to this is playing poker by telephone [1]. If an audience can
be convinced that a fair coin toss is possible, the poker game becomes
considerably more believable.
Again it is helpful to encourage the audience to consider how a
fair coin toss could be achieved, and to point out how cheating is
possible if you don't trust the person at the other end. The relevance
of such techniques can be motivated (for children) by considering a
coin toss with a rival school sports captain to determine where a game
will be held, or (for adults) the problems faced in businesses when
activities such as contracts, negotiations and voting need to be made
electronically between people who can't completely trust each other.
The technique we use employs a randomly chosen boolean circuit,
such as the one shown in Figure 1, as a one way function. In the
gure there are six inputs and six outputs. The presenter will need to
teach the operation of simple boolean gates (only and and or gates are
required).
The coin toss operates as follows, using the traditional characters
Alice and Bob to illustrate the process. Alice and Bob agree on a
randomly chosen boolean circuit (perhaps they each supply half). Alice
secretly selects a random input to the circuit (six zeroes and ones in
the example), and calculates the output. She then supplies the output
5Figure 1: A boolean circuit used as a one-way function for the coin-toss
to Bob, via the phone. Bob must guess the parity of the input (i.e.
the number of ones). He could do this reliably if he could determine
the input, but because a one-way function has been used, this is not
possible. Thus he might as well toss a coin to guess the parity. If he is
correct, he wins. Afterwards, Alice proves that she hasn't cheated by
providing the input that produced the given output.
Bob could cheat by nding an inverse function, but students can
determine by trial and error that this is not a simple task. Alice could
cheat by nding two inputs with opposite parity that produce the
same output. However, since Bob has an equal and independent role
in dening the circuit, she has no way to engineer such a situation,
which means that all she can hope to do is to compute such a pair
of inputs. Again, because the function is \one way" this is compu-
tationally dicult. Of course, for a six-bit domain and range a full
enumeration of all mappings is possible, although this would be very
tedious by hand. A stronger system would use more bits, and this
observation provides the opportunity to discuss how the strength of a
cryptographic systems can be measured in bits, and the exponential
increase in the search space as bits are added.
A simpler one-way function can be constructed using an identical
pair of calculators. Alice enters a secret number into her calculator,
6and then presses the sin (or sqrt) button three times. The output of
the function is (say) the last three digits displayed. Bob must then
guess if Alice's original number was odd or even.
5 The perfect code problem
Finding a perfect code is an easily explained problem on graphs that
can be used as an alternative one-way function for the coin-toss pro-
tocol, and also as the basis of the public key system described in the
next section.
A perfect code1 on a graph G =( V;E)i st h es e tV 0 such that for
every vertex v there is exactly one u in N[v]w i t hu in V 0,w h e r eN[v]
is the neighborhood of v.
Of course, we don't use this denition with school-children! In-
stead, we present the graph as a street map, where edges are roads
and vertices are intersections. Finding a dominating set is introduced
as a resource placement problem: for example, students relate well to
the \ice-cream vendor" problem, in which ice-cream vendors must be
placed in a seaside township so that no-one has to walk past more
than one intersection to buy an ice-cream. Figure 2 shows a map
with a solution requiring just six vendors (open circles in the gure).
Each intersection with a vendor \covers" (dominates) the neighboring
intersections, so the solution shown covers the entire map.
The solution in Figure 2 is a perfect code (exact dominating set)
because every neighboring intersection is covered exactly once. An
example of a dominating set that is not exact would be to put a vendor
on every intersection.
After teaching children about the ice-cream vendor problem, we
have them solve some sample maps. They soon discover that it is
very dicult to nd the minimal solution|in fact, the problem of
determining whether a graph has a perfect code is NP-complete. We
then show them how to generate their own maps to which they know
the solution. This is very attractive, as a child can quickly draw a large
map that they can solve, yet their parents and teachers can't.
The map is generated by rst drawing the solution vertices as open
circles, and adding random neighboring vertices to them, as shown in
Figure 3. At this stage the solution is trivially obvious. It is then
disguised by randomly adding edges between the vertices, but not to
1The perfect code problem is also known as the exact dominating set problem. The
name \perfect codes" comes from coding theory, as the problem can be used to nd the
Hamming perfect error-correcting codes. This name may be confusing in this situation be-
cause it does not relate to cryptographic codes; in fact, we shall see that the cryptographic
codes generated are far from perfect.
7Figure 2: Solution to the ice-cream vendor problem using six vendors
Figure 3: Generating an ice-cream vendor (perfect code) problem.
any of the solution vertices. The map in Figure 2 was derived from the
one in Figure 3 this way.
The perfect code problem can be used for the coin-toss protocol
as follows. Alice devises a map that she knows the solution to, and
she sends it to Bob. Bob must guess whether the cardinality of the
solution is odd or even (any two perfect codes in a graph must have
the same cardinality). Bob wins if he is correct, and if he loses, Alice
can produce the perfect code to prove that he is wrong.
In the next section we show how to use the perfect code as the basis
of a child-proof public key system.
86 A Public Key System
Public key systems have revolutionised network security, providing
methods for safe key distribution, authentication, secure nancial trans-
actions, and secure email.
To present the essence of the idea, we dress the problem up as
passing a message in class so that even if the teacher knows how it
was encoded, they can't decode it. The value of such a method is
both obvious and attractive to students! Other applications can be
mentioned, such as prisoners communicating in front of a guard who
can see everything they write, or sending a credit card number over
the Internet with an eavesdropper recording every interaction.
The public key system is based on the perfect code described in
the previous section. The public key is the graph, and the private key
is the set of vertices that give an exact dominating set. The message
to be encrypted is an integer m, which might represent a letter of the
alphabet, or an entry in a codebook. The procedure is as follows:
1. Randomly associate an integer mv with each vertex v 2 V so
that X
v2V
mv = m
2. Associate the integer sv with each vertex v 2 V , calculated as
sv =
X
u2N[v]
mu
where N[v] is the neighborhood of v i.e. the set of all vertices
adjacent to v,a n dv itself.
3. Transmit the sv values.
To decrypt the message, sum the sv values for the vertices that are
solutions to the exact dominating set. This sum will include every mv
value exactly once, and therefore be equal to m.
Again, we would not use the above description to present the system
to a general audience. Rather, we work through an example of the
calculation as shown in Figure 4. In this example the message is the
number 66. The rst number at each vertex is mv, and the number in
parentheses is sv. A solution to the perfect code is the vertices that
have the mv (sv) values of 2 (13), 6 (13), 5 (22), and 1 (18), for which
the sv values sum to m = 66.
This system requires some care with arithmetic, and identifying
adjacent vertices, but students will achieve a great deal by working
through it.
This system is vulnerable to attack by forming a set of linear equa-
tions for the mv values, which can be solved eciently using Gaussian
9Figure 4: Calculations for the public key system to encode the number 66
elimination. If the students have the mathematical maturity to see
this, the observation provides an opportunity to discuss similar prob-
lems in \real" cryptosystems, which also rely on problems that may be
solved in the future.
7 A public key system based on the Di-
rected Cycle Partition problem
A public key system can also be based on the Directed Cycle Partition
problem. A directed cycle partition is a variation on the Hamiltonian
cycle for directed graphs. It is essentially a Hamiltonian cycle, but
the graph is allowed to be partitioned before a cycle is found in each
class. A Hamiltonian cycle is the special case where the only partition
allowed is the trivial partition with one class.
The directed cycle partition problem on a directed graph G =
(V;E) is to determine whether the vertex set of G be partitioned so
that there is a directed cycle through the vertices of each class of the
partition. This problem is conjectured to be NP-complete.
In our public key system, the public key is the directed graph, and
the private key is the partition and the directed cycles. To encrypt a
message that is a positive integer m:
1. Randomly associate an integer mv with each vertex v 2 V so
10that X
v2V
mv = m
2. Randomly associate an integer rv with each vertex v 2 V .
3. Label each arc uv with
mu + ru − rv
4. The encrypted message is the graph G together with the arc
labels.
Decryption is performed by summing over the arc labels of the
directed cycles. In this sum, the rv terms cancel out, leaving m. This
is vulnerable to the same linear algebra attack as the perfect code
system.
The directed cycle partition problem should be introduced using
a real-world problem that the audience can relate to. For example
(continuing with the ice-cream theme), the problem might be to plan
a route for a mobile ice-cream van that drives around, stopping at
street corners|it is very important that the van does not go past a
corner twice, because children will see the van and be disappointed that
it doesn't stop. Partitioning can be introduced by allowing multiple
vans.
8 Conclusion
The activities discussed above have been used with diverse groups of
children and adults, ranging from elementary-school children to univer-
sity students. They have been carried out with enthusiasm by young
and old alike, and it is gratifying to see that many of those who par-
ticipate reach an understanding of what are generally regarded as ad-
vanced cryptographic techniques. We hope that other educators and
cryptography experts will use these methods to improve the public
understanding of these complex but important topics.
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